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Abstract
Both Kripke models and interpreted systems have been put forward as basic models of
multi-agent systems and for reasoning about Knowledge in such systems. This paper enriches
previous comparisons of these two forms of semantics by considering categories of models in
both cases and then shows that constructions given by Lomuscio and Ryan, extend to give an
adjoint equivalence between the two settings. This equivalence is exploited in a discussion of
colimits of interpreted systems.
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1. Introduction
In the study of ‘knowledge’ in complex systems in arti9cial intelligence, various
logics have played a central role. In multi-agent systems, (MAS), one of the basic
logics used is S5n. This is a modal logic 9rst introduced in philosophical logic by
Hintikka, [7], and later used in the theory of distributed computing [3]. The best
known semantics of modal logics is probably Kripke semantics, based on the theory of
(Kripke) Frames, see, for instance, [10] for an up-to-date treatment. The important use
of category theory in such sources, in recent work on coalgebraic semantics for modal
logics, [1,8,11,18], and, of course, its extensive use within investigations of semantics
within theoretical computer science, suggested that it might be a useful additional tool
for the theory of multi-agent systems, an area where no categorical treatment was
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yet available. A further bene9t of a categorical view should be greater Eexibility for
extensions to non-deterministic or ‘vague’ settings.
This is the 9rst of a series of papers for a project: ‘Categorical Perspectives on
Multiagent Systems’, which sets out to see if a categorical approach can shed useful
light on this area. As such, it deliberately restricts attention to fairly well known and
simple models for MASs so, for instance, the underlying logic will be S5n and no
common knowledge operator is assumed. It seemed better to try out the use of category
theory using only an elementary fragment of what is available, for instance, from
categorical logic. Of course, as the level of categorical language used is restricted, the
descriptive power of that language is limited. To focus the study, this 9rst paper looks
at a comparison of Kripke frames with another model for MASs and their inherent
logic, namely interpreted systems. These have the advantage that their semantics are
somewhat more intuitive and nearer to MAS in their interpretation. This led Lomuscio
and Ryan in [12] to ask:
Is one of the approaches more specialised than the other? What is the di1erence
between the two generated logics? Is it possible to use the powerful techniques de-
veloped for Kripke models to MAS de7ned in terms of the more intuitive systems?
Is it possible to identify in terms of frames key MAS usually de7ned in terms of
interpreted systems?
In later papers, [13–15], the question of the comparison of these diHerent semantics
was explored and the results applied to a number of diHerent problems. The results are
not conclusive however although suggestive that the answer should be that the seman-
tics are in some sense ‘equipotent’. In this paper the simple notion of morphisms of
models is adapted from the categorical treatment of modal logics, and applied to this
problem. The result is that the categories of models are seen to be equivalent (apart
from some extraneous stuH) and to show that constructions adapted from those given
by Lomuscio and Ryan yield a pair of adjoint functors between the two semantic cate-
gories. This can be seen as con9rming the comparison given by them, but it also raises
some additional questions related to the structures that exist in these two categories.
As suggested, the constructions and the essential ideas of some of the proofs are in
the literature already, but without the simple additional idea of a morphism of models
in the two settings the theory ends up seeming incomplete.
As an application of the equivalence results, we examine the existence of colimits
in both the Kripke semantic categories and the interpreted system context. The reason
for doing this is that it seems possible that many, if not all, interpreted systems can be
decomposed as colimits of hypercubes. This might allow analysis of the systems and
their associated logics via a modularisation procedure which would have clear advan-
tages for verifying speci9cations of systems. The category of frames has colimits as
is fairly easy to show, but for interpreted systems and sets of global states, the proce-
dure is considerably more complicated. Certain problems that relate to the construction
of colimits in these contexts are very closely related to the non-existence of modular
formulae to specify those frames that arise from sets of global states.
The level of category theory used has been restricted so as to make the paper more
accessible to workers in MASs, where categorical language has not been widely used
as yet. This does have a ‘downside’, of course. Some sections of the paper could be
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reduced in length by employing a more sophisticated level of categorical machinery.
Where this is the case, it has seemed useful to include a few brief technical remarks
indicating that deeper level. These remarks can, of course, be ignored by the reader
without the specialist categorical knowledge.
The level of category theory used here is kept to a minimum, but the success that
subject has had in other related areas of logic and theoretical computer science suggests
that a more detailed evaluation of its potential for the study of MAS may be useful.
2. Preliminaries
A positive integer n will be 9xed throughout, so there will be n-agents concerned:
A= {1; 2; : : : ; n}.
Frames. An equivalence Kripke frame, Kripke frame (or simply frame) F =(W;∼1;
: : : ;∼n) consists of a set W with, for each i∈A, an equivalence relation ∼i on W .
Elements of W are called worlds and are denoted w; w′, etc. We will write [w]i for
the equivalence class of the element w∈W for the ith equivalence relation, ∼i.
We will not be concentrating much attention on interpretation, at least to start with,
but for completeness: an equivalence Kripke model M =(F; ) is a pair, where F is
an equivalence frame and  is an interpretation for the atoms of the language being
studied (in this case essentially S5n):
 :W → P(P):
Alternatively, we can use a valuation
 :P → P(W )
evaluating the atoms as subsets of the set of possible worlds ((p) is to be thought
of as the set of worlds at which p is true.) These viewpoints are dual to each other,
and emphasise diHerent viewpoints, but a third, neutral and equivalent viewpoint is to
specify the interpretation by a subset
R ⊆ P ×W:
The interpretation version gives
(w) = {p | (p;w) ∈ R};
the valuation version: (p)= {w | (p;w)∈R}. Various sources we will refer to use
one or the other as is most convenient for their context, but translation between them
is, of course, routine.
A weak map of frames f :F→F ′=(W ′;∼′1; : : : ;∼′n) is a function f :W →W ′ such
that for each i,
if w ∼i w′; then f(w) ∼′i f(w′):
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Frames and the corresponding maps form a category which we will denote Framesw.
The map f will give a map of models f : (F; )→ (F ′; ′) if
W
f 





 W ′
′



P(P)
commutes.
Note. A weak map is a natural naive notion, but is not well behaved logically. To
obtain a better behaved one, it is usual to introduce bounded morphisms (see below). In
this paper we will use weak maps when they are suKcient but it is really the bounded
morphisms that take the centre stage. We will usually omit ‘bounded’, but will refer
to ‘weak maps’ as such. The category of frames and weak maps will thus be denoted
Framesw, whilst that of frames and bounded morphisms by Frames.
Bounded morphisms (p-morphisms). A Kripke frame is a relational structure and an
important class of morphism between two such structures of the same type is that of
‘bounded morphisms’ or ‘p-morphisms. (Goldblatt [6] uses ‘bounded’ as the existential
quanti9cation in the de9nition is a bounded one. The origins of the term ‘p-morphism’
are somewhat obscure, but see the discussion of [16, p. 30]. If the equivalence relations
of use in the frame are thought of as groupoids, i.e. small categories with all morphisms
isomorphisms, then a bounded morphism is a morphism that is a 9bration for all of the
diHerent groupoid structures involved.) A bounded morphism is also just a functional
bisimulation, but we will not be exploring the potential of this fact in this paper.
Denition. A weak map f :F→F ′ of frames is bounded if for each i; 16i6n and
u∈W , v′ ∈W ′, if f(u) ∼′i v′, then there is some v∈W such that f(v)= v′ and u ∼i v,
i.e.
f(u) ∼′i v′ if and only if ∃v ∈ W (f(v) = v′ and u ∼i v):
Remark. The de9nition as given above is adapted from [15, De9nition 2.4]. but with
no assumption of surjectivity. The more formal reprise of the de9nition is the form
given by Goldblatt [6] in the discussion in his Section 4.1. It is, of course, equivalent
to the apparently weaker verbal form as f is a weak map.
Global states of interpreted systems. A set of global states (SGS) for an interpreted
system is a subset S of the product Le×L1× · · · ×Ln with each Le, Li non-empty.
The set Li represents the local states possible for agent i and Le the possible states of
the environment.
We will restrict attention to the case where Le has just one element.
An interpreted system is a pair (S; ) where
 : S → P(P)
as before.
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Although S ⊆ ∏ni=1 Li, it would seem that the actual sets Li play only a minor role
in the theory. Of more importance will be the decomposition of S into the ‘9bres’ of
the various projection maps
pi : S → Li
coming from the product structure on
∏n
i=1 Li. For the moment we will keep the
information on the Li in the notation, but will study more formally later the way it
can be discarded.
If S ⊆ ∏ni=1 Li, we will write (S; L) for the SGS, where L=(L1; : : : ; Ln).
A weak map, f : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′), consists of functions fi :Li→L′i inducing
f =
∏
fi :
∏
Li →
∏
L′i ;
which is required to satisfy
f(S) ⊆ S ′:
(Thus if s=(l1; : : : ; ln)∈ S,
f(s) = (f1(l1); : : : ; fn(ln)) ∈ S ′:)
Remark. (i) In the study of dynamics for interpreted systems, in the related VSK
logics [19,20] and in the study of homogeneous broadcast systems [15], the actions
or state transformers correspond to weak endomorphisms of the underlying interpreted
system.
(ii) The equivalence relations resulting from the projection maps do not positively
link states of aHairs that the agents can reason about, rather they ascribe properties to
the agents, giving a ‘birds eye view’ of the system. One of the referees of this paper
suggested an example from a cryptography context, where one is interested not in
deciding “whether or not the attacker knows the key” but “whether or not the attacker
has witnessed enough information to be able to deduce the key” (cf. [4]).
(iii) It is perhaps useful to comment on the use of the subsets S of the product∏
Li in the above de9nition. This should be seen primarily as resulting from the
dynamic construction of the formalism. In examples, the set S is a set of reachable
states resulting from protocols, actions or transition functions, depending on the context,
from a set of initial states, and, of course, there is no reason to expect all states of the
product to be ‘reachable’. This is discussed in a little more detail in the paper [17].
Bounded morphisms of global states. We will see later how to translate between frames
and systems of global states. Under this translation, the following is the corresponding
notion of bounded morphism.
Denition. A weak map f=(fi)ni=1, fi :Li→L′i , as above, is said to be a bounded
morphism if given w∈ S; w′ ∈ S ′,
f(w)i = w′i if and only if ∃t ∈ S(∀j f(t)j = w′j and ti = wi):
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A morphism of interpreted systems f : (S; )→ (S ′; ′) is simply a morphism f : (S; L)
→ (S ′; L′) for which the diagram
S
f 





 S ′
′



P(P)
commutes.
As with models based on frames, these de9nitions come in various Eavours, as given
here, dual ones with ‘interpretations’ replaced by ‘valuations’, or neutral using a subset
of P× S.
Essential equivalence of morphisms of global states. Two distinct morphisms of SGSs,
as de9ned above, might be diHerent only outside the support of their domain, i.e. on
the local states of some agent, they diHer at some state, but that state is not involved in
the support S of (S; L). From the viewpoint of modelling the multiagent systems, the
morphisms are clearly ‘equivalent’. The de9nition below captures that notion precisely,
but note the need for care with the ‘empty SGS’.
De9ne two maps f
0
; f
1
: (S; L)→ (S ′; L′) to be essentially equivalent if f
0
(s)=
f
1
(s) for all s∈ S, i.e. f
0
and f
1
only diHer, if at all, away from the “support” S.
We will write f
0
f
1
in this case. Two (non-empty) SGSs, (S; L) and (S ′; L′), will
be essentially equivalent if there are maps
f : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′);
g : (S ′; L′)→ (S; L)
with
gf  Id(S;L); fg  Id(S′ ;L′):
We would in this case say that f is an essential equivalence. Of course, this implies
that g is one as well.
Gloss. This de9nition needs extending slightly for a technical reason. For any sequence
of local states L, we do have an empty SGS based on L, namely (∅; L). These empty
SGSs clearly should all be essentially equivalent, but the above de9nition does not
make them so since, if any Li is itself empty, there can be no function to that set from
a non-empty one! The extreme case of this is (∅; ∅). There is a unique morphism from
(∅; ∅) to any (S; L), but no morphism back, so with the above de9nition (∅; ∅) is not
equivalent to (∅; L). We therefore extend the de9nition by:
In addition any two empty SGSs are deemed to be essentially equivalent with the
initial morphisms,
(∅; L)→ (∅; L);
all declared to be essential equivalences.
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Clearly for practically occurring interpreted systems this ‘gloss’ on the de9nition will
not be needed very often, but it is necessary to avoid awkward exclusions of cases in
statements of results later on.
Denition. We will say that (S; L) is replete (or irredundant) if for i=1; 2; : : : ; n; pi(S)
=Li; in other words for each li ∈Li, there is some global state s∈ S which involves li.
Lemma 1. Any non-empty (S; L) is essentially equivalent to a replete system of global
states.
Proof. Given any (S; L), set p(S)= (p1(S); : : : ; pn(S)), then
∏
p(S)⊆∏L and S is in
bijective correspondence with
S ′ = {(p1(s); : : : ; pn(s)): s ∈ S};
since if s=(l1; : : : ; ln); pi(s)= li. Whether or not S = S ′ is a question that will not
concern us, but no harm will come from identifying them so we can consider S as
a subset of
∏
p(S) which gives a SGS, (S; p(S)), which is replete and comes with
natural inclusions ik :pk(S)→Lk ; k =1; : : : ; n, giving a map
i : (S; p(S))→ (S; L):
This is claimed to be an essential equivalence. In fact, for each k =1; : : : ; n, pick an
element pk(sk)∈pk(S) and de9ne gk :Lk →pk(S) by
gk(x) =
{
x if x ∈ pk(S);
pk(sk) if x =∈ pk(S):
The resulting g=(g1; : : : ; gn) retracts (S; L) back into (S; p(S)), moreover by its de9-
nition gi Id(S;p(S)), whilst ig diHers from Id(S; L) only away from S, so
ig Id(S;L):
The necessity for ‘non-empty’ in this result is the reason for our earlier ‘gloss’ in
the de9nition of essential equivalence.
Hypercube systems. A very natural class of replete interpreted systems is that of hy-
percubes (cf. [12–15]). Again we will assume Le is a singleton.
Denition. A hypercube system or simply hypercube is a system of global states (S; L)
where S =
∏n
i=1 Li.
The identity intersection property. A useful class of frames is described by the identity
intersection property.
Denition. A frame F =(W;∼1; : : : ;∼n) satis9es the identity intersection property if⋂n
i=1 ∼i is the identity equivalence relation.
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Any system of global states determines a frame whose ith equivalence relation classes
are determined by the 9bres of the projection, pi : S→Li, and it is clear that if (S; L) is
a system of global states, then the corresponding frame satis9es the identity intersection
property. (A proof is given in [15, Lemma 3.1] for hypercubes, but that proof works
in more generality.)
We will follow [15] in using the term ‘I -frame’ for a frame satisfying the identity
intersection property.
Categories of global states. Sets of global states together with morphisms between
them form a category which will be denoted by Glob:States. For some purposes a
‘quotient’ category of Glob:States will be more useful. This will have the same ob-
jects, but essential equivalence classes of morphisms as its morphisms. (When needed,
we will denote this by [Glob:States]:) The same convention with regard to weak as
against bounded morphisms will apply here as for Kripke frames=models, a suKx w
will indicate the subcategory with the ‘arrows’ being the weak maps.
3. An equivalence of categories?
We will initially examine the situation for the categories with weak maps as their
arrows and then will check for compatibility with boundedness.
3.1. From global states to frames
Let (S; L) be a set of global states. De9ne its associated equivalence frame by
F(S; L) = (S;∼1; : : : ;∼n);
where if l; l′ ∈ S,
l ∼i l′ if and only if pi(l) = pi(l′):
Lemma 2. F de7nes a functor
F :Glob:Statesw → Framesw:
Proof. This is routine and is left as an exercise.
Note. Essentially equivalent objects get sent to isomorphic frames.
3.2. : : : and back again
Given an equivalence frame
F = (W;∼1; : : : ;∼n);
we form the sequence
W = (W1; : : : ; Wn)
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with Wi = W=∼i, the set of equivalence classes of elements of W for the relation, ∼i.
There is a ‘diagonal’ function
$ :W →∏W
de9ned by
$(w) = ([w]1; : : : ; [w]n):
De9ne G(F)= ($(W ); W ).
(N.B. This construction is diHerent from that in [13], but is almost that given by
Lomuscio et al. [15], see their Lemma 3.2.)
Lemma 3. G de7nes a functor
G :Framesw → Glob:Statesw:
Proof. Just check.
3.3. Are F and G adjoint?
As they link frames and SGSs in a natural way, it is natural to expect that these two
functors are adjoints, if not equivalences. Which way around the adjunction should be
is fairly clear: G is de9ned using a quotienting construction, thus is given by a colimit.
This is typical of left adjoints so we will attempt to compare
Framesw(F;F(S; L))
with
Glob:Statesw(G(F); (S; L)):
In fact, part of this analysis is already in the literature in another form, cf. [15], but
will need interpreting in a categorical form. Here F =(W;∼1; : : : ;∼n), and (S; L) is a
set of global states.
Suppose f :W →F(S; L) is a weak map of frames, so if w ∼i w′, then f(w) ∼i
f(w′). Let fi =pif :W →Li, then w ∼i w′ implies fi(w)=fi(w′), so fi factors canon-
ically as
W
qi→W= ∼i fi→Li;
where qi is the natural quotient map qi(w)= [w]i.
De9ne
f =
n∏
i=1
fi :
∏
Wi →
∏
Li;
where, as before, we write Wi for W=∼i. Thus
f([w1]1; : : : ; [wn]n) = (f1(w1); : : : ; fn(wn));
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hence
f($(w)) = f(w) ∈ S;
i.e. f($(W )) ⊂ S.
Note that f is completely determined by f, so we have de9ned a function
Framesw(F;F(S; L))→ Glob:Statesw(G(F); (S; L));
f → f
Next, assume given some weak map
g :G(F)→ (S; L):
Thus we are given functions gi :Wi → Li, which together de9ne
g =
∏
gi :
∏
Wi →
∏
Li
and for which g($(W )) ⊆ S.
Thus for any w∈W , setting
g˜(w) = (g1[w]1; : : : ; gn[w]n);
we have g˜(w)∈ S. This de9nes a function
g˜ :W → S
and pig˜(w)= gi[w]i.
Lemma 4.
g˜ : (W;∼1; : : : ;∼n)→ (S;∼′1; : : : ;∼′n)
(where s ∼′i s′ if and only if pi(s)=pi(s′)) is a weak map of equivalence frames.
Proof. If w ∼i w′, then [w]i = [w′]i, so gi[w]i = gi[w′]i, that is pig˜(w)=pig˜(w′), as
required.
Lemma 5. (i) If f :W →F(S; L), then (˜f)=f.
(ii) If g :G(F)→ (S; L), then g=(g˜).
Proof. (i) Suppose w∈W; (˜f)(w)= (f1[w]1; : : : ; fn[w]n)=(f1(w); : : : ; fn(w))=f(w).
(ii) Suppose ([w1]1; : : : ; [wn]n)∈
∏
Wi,
(g˜)([w1]1; : : : ; [wn]n) = (p1g˜(w1); : : : ; png˜(wn))
= (g1[w1]1 : : : ; gn[wn]n) = g([w1]1; : : : ; [wn]n):
as required.
To improve notation, let
& = &F;(S;L) : Framesw(F;F(S; L))→ Glob:Statesw(G(F); (S; L));
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be de9ned by
&(f) = f:
We then have that & is a natural bijection and &−1(g)= g˜. (Naturality is easy to
check.) Thus:
Theorem 1. The functor G is left adjoint to the functor F .
The importance of many adjointness statements for applications comes from the im-
plications that adjointness has on the transfer of limiting and colimiting constructions—
so-called exactness properties. We will examine the existence of limits and colimits in
these categories later. Another spin-oH is the description of adjoints as being solutions
to universal properties. This, in turn, reduces to questions of the properties of the unit
and counit of the adjunction and it is to these we turn next.
As we have detailed descriptions of & and &−1, it is relatively easy to examine the
unit 'F :F→FG(F) and counit ”(S; L) :GF(S; L)→ (S; L) of the adjunction.
To make this paper more accessible for the non-categorically initiated, let us recall
brieEy that, in general, if F :C→D and G :D→C are two functors which are adjoint
with a natural isomorphism
& :D(D; FC)
∼=→C(GD;C)
then we actually know very little about D(D; FC) for a general arbitrary pair of objects
D and C, as there may be no morphisms from D to FC in D. However in one case,
namely when D=FC, the existence of the identity morphism from FC to itself is
guaranteed (by the axioms for categories), so we know
idFC ∈ D(FC; FC)
and thus that &(idFC)∈C(GFC; C). This morphism &(idFC) will be denoted
+C :GF(C)→ C:
It is called the counit of the adjunction and it is standard that given any morphism
g : G(D)→ C;
there is a unique factorisation of g through +C ; in fact, g∈C(GD;C) corresponds to
g′=&−1(g) :D → F(C);
which induces (under the application of G)
G(g′) :G(D)→ GF(C);
and g= +CG(g′) :G(D)→C. Thus, in a precise sense, this counit (at C) is the universal
approximation to C by objects in the image of G. The assignment of the morphism +C
to the object C gives a natural transformation, which is the counit of the adjunction.
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Returning to our adjunction between F and G, let (S; L) be a set of global states.
We have
F(S; L)= (S;∼1; : : : ;∼n);
where s∼i s′ if and only if pi(s)=pi(s′). Thus for W = S in our earlier description,
Wi =pi(S) and the diagonal function
$ : S →∏pi(S)
sends s to (p1(s); : : : ; pn(s)). Of course, if s=(l1; : : : ; ln) then pi(s)= li, so $(s) is
‘really’ s, but considered as an element of the subset
∏
pi(S) rather than of
∏
Li. In
fact, GF(S; L)= (S; p(S)), the replete system essentially equivalent to (S; L).
Now the obvious natural morphism from (S; p(S)) to (S; L) is that which is the
inclusion of the various pi(S) into Li. We will see that this is +(S; L).
Consider idF(S; L) :F(S; L)→ F(S; L), then
&(idF(S;L))= idF(S;L):
The explicit description of the ‘bar’ construction calculates piidF(S; L) : S→Li, which
is, of course, pi itself. It then factors through
S → pi(S);
so pi :pi(S)→Li is the inclusion and idF(S; L) is the inclusion of
∏
pi(S) into
∏
Li.
As we have noted that $(S)= S modulo this subset inclusion, we have shown that
+(S; L) is as claimed.
As a consequence:
Proposition 1. If (S; L) is a replete system, then +(S; L) is an isomorphism.
Proposition 2 (Lomuscio and Ryan). If S =
∏
Li, so (S; L) is a hypercube system,
then +(S; L) is an isomorphism, (in fact the identity).
In general, of course, +(S; L) is an essential equivalence.
Proposition 3. The above adjunction induces one between Framesw and [Glob:
Statesw], making the latter category equivalent to a re<exive subcategory of the cat-
egory of frames.
Proof. Although fairly obvious given the previous results (and a simple categorical
consequence of the type of adjunction encountered here), we include some idea of the
proof for those readers not used to categorical arguments.
For any (S; L), F(S; L) and F(S; p(S)) are the same (i.e. equal not merely isomor-
phic!). For any frame F , G(F) is a replete system, and by the adjunction between
F and G, any morphism from G(F) to (S; L) factors uniquely through GF(S; L). We
thus have the following:
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Lemma 6.
(i) Framesw(F;F(S; L))=Framesw(F;FGF(S; L));
(ii) Glob:Statesw(G(F); (S; L))∼=Glob:Statesw(G(F);GF(S; L))
∼= [Glob:Statesw](G(F); (S; L)):
In fact to shed a little more light on the relationship between Glob:Statesw and
[Glob:Statesw], consider
f0; f1 : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′);
two morphisms in Glob:Statesw, which are essentially equivalent, so f0(s)=f1(s) for
all s∈ S. Clearly
F(f0) = F(f1);
so GF(f0)=GF(f1). Conversely if GF(f0)=GF(f1) for two weak maps, then
f0+(S;L) = f1+(S;L);
so f0(s)=f1(s) for all s∈ S and f0  f1. Thus each equivalence class of maps from
(S; L) to (S ′; L′) has a unique representative in
Glob:Statesw(GF(S; L);GF(S ′; L′)):
Conversely suppose we have a weak map, f from GF(S; L) to GF(S ′; L′), i.e. from
(S; p(S)) to (S ′; p′(S ′)), then pick a retraction, ret from (S; L) to (S; p(S)) by allocating
points outside pi(S)⊂Li arbitrarily. (The empty case is left to the reader!) Then form
the composite
(S; L) ret→(S; p(S)) f→(S ′; p′(S ′))
+(S′ ;p′(S′))−→ (S; p(S)):
Now apply GF to get back to f itself. Thus we have
[Glob:Statesw]((S; L); (S
′; L′)) ∼= Glob:Statesw(GF(S; L);GF(S ′; L′)):
If (S; L) is replete, this is isomorphic to Glob:Statesw((S; L);GF(S ′; L′)), which gives
more detail on why (ii) holds.
To sum up there is a natural isomorphism:
(i) Framesw(F;F((S; L)))∼= [Glob:Statesw](G(F); (S; L));
(ii) the counit [+(S; L)] :GF(S; L)→ (S; L) is an isomorphism (since +(S; L) is an essen-
tial equivalence).
This means that [Glob:Statesw] is equivalent, as a category, to a reEexive subcategory
of the category of frames.
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This does more than justice to the counit! For fairness we should look at the unit
of the adjunction, ' : IdFrames→FG. This should measure the information lost through
using FG(F) rather than F itself.
Let F =(W; {∼i}ni=1), then FG(F)= ($(W ); {∼′i}ni=1), where
$ :W →
n∏
i=1
Wi with Wi = W=∼i ;
and ∼′i is de9ned using the projections. The morphism 'F :F→FG(F) sends w to the
string ([w]1; : : : ; [w]n). This is a morphism, since if
w ∼i w′ then pi$(w) = [w]i = [w′]i = pi$(w′):
The properties of ' relate well to the results found by Lomuscio and Ryan in [13].
Lemma 7. The unit, 'F , is an isomorphism if and only if
⋂n
i=1 ∼i = idW .
Proof. If $(w)=$(w′), then w∼i w′ for all i so 'F is one–one if and only if the
intersection of the equivalence relations is discrete. As $ is always onto, this completes
the proof.
In fact, this lemma gives us the internal description of the image of the category
[Glob:Statesw] in Framesw and thus of the reEection, namely that image is the full
subcategory of I -frames.
Proposition 4. The full subcategory, I -Framesw, of Framesw determined by those
Kripke equivalence frames that satisfy the identity intersection property, is a re<exive
subcategory with re<ection L=FG. This subcategory is equivalent to that of global
states with essential equivalence classes of weak maps.
Proof. This is an easy consequence, categorically, of the properties of the adjoint
equivalence already discussed in detail. For instance, L is idempotent, L2 =L, since
[+(S; L)] is an isomorphism, so
L2 = FGFG F(+G)−→ FG=L
is one as well.
One can also approach it directly using the intersection of the equivalence relations.
De9ne
∼=
n⋂
i=1
∼i;
for a frame F =(W;∼1; : : : ;∼n), form F=∼ with set of worlds W=∼ and with the
induced equivalence relations, which will be denoted ≈i; thus if [w] denotes the
∼-equivalence class of w,
[w] ≈i [w′] if and only if w ∼i w′:
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Of course, this is well de9ned and the quotienting map
gF :F → F= ∼
is a weak map of frames, by construction.
Lemma 8. (i) For any F , the quotient frame F=∼ is an I -frame.
(ii) If f :F→F ′ is any weak map with F ′ an I -frame, then f factors uniquely
via qF :
F
f 
qF




 F ′
F= ∼
∃!f′

(iii) The map qF is a bounded morphism.
(iv) For any frame, F , (F=∼)FG(F), and, up to this isomorphism, 'F = qF .
Proof. Most of this is routine to check, so we will just illustrate the proof of (iii).
(iii) Suppose u∈W , v′ ∈W=∼ with qF ≈i v′, then there is some w∈W with [w] = v′
and [u]≈i [w], i.e. u∼i w, but then this w is exactly what is needed for the de9nition
of bounded morphism. (It is worth remarking that this situation is special as the same
‘lift’ of v′ can be used for all i. The de9nition of bounded morphism only assumes a
lift exists for each i.)
This lemma also completes the proof of the proposition.
The lemma, in fact, tells us more: namely that qF (that is 'F) is a bounded morphism
that is split, i.e. there is a splitting
F=∼ s→F
obtained by choosing a representative for each ∼-equivalence class (using the Axiom
of Choice if the set W is in9nite). That such a setwise splitting de9nes one at the
relational=frame level is easily seen, but the splitting will rarely be bounded, only
being so when F is already an I -frame in which case qF is an isomorphism.
This almost completes the comparison of the underlying structures for interpreted
systems and Kripke models for basic S5n-systems. We have seen that
(i) sets of global states may have redundancy, i.e. may not be replete;
(ii) Kripke frames may have worlds that are not distinguishable by any of the
equivalence relations, i.e. in the multi-agent interpretation, are not distinguishable by
any agents, so for the system, they are equivalent worlds.
If one eliminates redundancy and the existence of indistinguishable worlds, the two
settings are equivalent. No multi-agent system can see states that are not in S, even
though individual agents may ‘see’ the image in their state space of such a state and,
as was just said, no multi-agent system can distinguish indistinguishable worlds! This
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also implies they cannot test if a frame is an I -frame (which is the interpretation of
the result that the I -property is not describable in terms of modal operators).
Categorical aside. The above argument is, of course, just a simple instance of a gen-
eral categorical fact. The adjunction of Theorem 1 induces an idempotent monad on
Framesw and an idempotent comonad on Glob:Statesw. The monad
L : Framesw → Framesw
send a frame to its quotient with respect to the largest bisimulation, and general facts
about idempotent monads yield the equivalences that have been noted. (Useful refer-
ences for idempotent monads are Borceux [2], vol. II; Johnstone [9, Chap. IV]). The
generality of the categorical approach is also highly relevant if one wishes to consider
weakening from S5n-based logics to ones with order theoretic semantics.
The above comparison does not address the question of models, only the underlying
relational structures. We will look shortly at the geometric models. Before doing that
it will be useful to consider what the adjoint equivalence does to bounded morphisms.
First observe that the composite of bounded morphisms is bounded, both for frames
and for sets of global states. Because of this we can form a category from global states
(resp. frames) and bounded morphisms only. These will be denoted Glob:States (resp.
Frames).
Proposition 5. (i) If f :F→F ′ is a bounded morphism of frames, then G(f) is a
bounded morphism of global states.
(ii) If G : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′) is a bounded morphism of global states, then F(g) is a
bounded morphism of frames.
(iii) The unit and counit of the G, F adjunction are bounded morphisms.
Proof. Condition (i) is simply a matter of notation: the given condition is that
G(f)($(!))i = $(!′)i ;
but this is a convoluted way of noting that
f(!) ∼i !′:
Applying the fact that f is bounded gives a v∈W and t=$(v) does the job for the
conclusion.
Condition (ii) is even more direct and is left to the reader.
Condition (iii) can be approached in several diHerent ways. It has already been noted
for 'F and +(S; L) is an essential equivalence. Any essential equivalence is bounded, as
is easily checked.
Theorem 2. The functors F and G induce an adjoint pair, (which will also be denoted
F , and G) between Frames and Glob:States.
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Proof. We start by proving adjointness, i.e. that & induces another &,
& :Frames(F;F(S; L)) ∼= Glob:States(G(F); (S; L)):
This follows from the previous proposition:
if f :F→F(S; L), then &(f)= Tf as described earlier. It is standard that
&(f)= +(S;L):G(f)
and if f is bounded then by the proposition, so is G(f). The counit is naturally
bounded and composites of bounded morphisms are bounded, so &(f) is bounded.
The veri9cation that, if g :G(F)→ (S; L) is bounded, then so is g˜=&−1(g)=
F(g):'F , is almost identical.
Of course, it is also easy to verify this directly.
Of course, restricting to I -Frames and passing to [Glob:States] gives an equivalence
of categories. This eHectively answers the questions posed by Lomuscio and Ryan [12].
The only possible extra power of Kripke frames would be if they could express the
diHerence between ordinary frames and I -frames, but in [15], a neat example is given
that shows that no modal formula can correspond to property I . Thus these two forms
of geometric semantics have equivalent expressive power.
4. Compatibility with the models
We have not yet considered the compatibility of the functors with the model struc-
tures, in other words we have not considered whether they preserve the logic.
Kripke models. Earlier we de9ned f : (F; )→ (F ′; ′) to be a map of models if
W






f W ′
′



P(P)
commutes. Recalling the notion of satisfaction of a formula - in a world w of M =
(F; ) and the corresponding notion of validity of -, we note
M;w |= p if p ∈ (w);
M; w |= ¬- if M;w |= -;
M; w |= - ∧  if M;w |= - and M;w |=  ;
M; w |= ✷i if for each w′ ∈ W; with w ∼i w′; we have M;w′ |= -:
A formula - is valid on a model M if M;w |=- for every !∈W .
(We will sometimes use F; w |= - as an alternative notation for (F; ); w |=-, when
this makes the formula easier to read or when it is more convenient for the context.)
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The notion of satisfaction for an interpreted system, (S; ), suppressing the local
states Li in the notation, is given, for instance, in [5]. This is explicitly in terms of
the associated Kripke model, that is what we have denoted F(S; L). Explicitly, in our
notation, if s∈ S is a state of the system
S; s |= - if and only if F(S; L); s |= -;
the latter in the sense already discussed.
Proposition 6. Given M =(F; ) a Kripke model with F an I -frame, and w∈W , a
world,
M;w |= - if and only if (G(F); '−1F ); $(w) |= -:
Proof. This follows easily from the fact that
'F :F → FG(F)
is an isomorphism if F is an I -frame. As the set of states=worlds of G(F) and of
FG(F) are the same, the interpretation '−1F does make sense.
If F is an ordinary frame, i.e. not necessarily an I -frame, then this result does not
seem to have an analogue in general. It does, however, provided that the interpretation
 :W →P(P) satis9es an obvious compatibility condition.
We will say that the interpretation  is compatible with the frame structure on W if
w1 ∼ w2 implies (w1) = (w2):
Proposition 7. If F =(W;∼1; : : : ;∼n) is a Kripke frame and M =(F; ) with  com-
patible with the frame structure, then there is an interpretation ′ :G(F)→P(P) such
that for any formula - and world w,
M;w |= - if and only if (G(F); ′); $(w) |= -:
Proof. If x=([x]1; : : : ; [x]n)∈$(W ), de9ne ′(x)= (x). This is well de9ned. The
proof now proceeds in the obvious way by an induction. We indicate the 9rst step
only.
Suppose M;w |=p then p ∈ (w)= ′(w), so (FG(F); ′); 'F(w) |=p, i.e. (G(F); ′);
$(w) |=p. The argument is reversible and the induction is now standard.
Before interpreting these results for the two types of models, it is important to
connect up the notion of morphism of models with other notions from the modal
logic literature. We use Kracht [10] as a source, but note that he uses valuations
L :P→P(W ) rather than interpretations  :W →P(P), thus the forms of de9nitions
will look somewhat diHerent. Also we have given them in a form for equivalence
frames, not the more general form used in [10].
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Suppose f :F→F ′ is a morphism of frames and  :W →P(P) is an interpretation
of the worlds of F . We say f is admissible for  if for any w1; w2 ∈W
f(w1) = f(w2) implies (w1) = (w2):
Comparison with the above discussion on ‘compatibility’ shows that the frame map
qF :F → F=∼
is admissible for  if and only if  is compatible with the frame structure.
Another example is if
W






f W ′
′



P(P)
commutes for some ′, then f is admissible for .
This raises the interesting inverse question as to whether or not given
W






f W ′
P(P)
there is a suitable ′. We split the question in two:
(i) is there an optimal ′ such that
6 ′f
(where 6′f is to be interpreted as
for all w ∈ W; (w) ⊆ ′f(w)):
We will call such an optimal ′ a minimal right lax extension of  along f.
Speci9cally we want a right lax extension of  along f to be an interpretation
f :W ′→P(P) such that:
(a) 6ff;
and
(b) if ′ :W ′→P(P) is an interpretation with 6′f, then f6′.
(ii) Dually, we ask if there is a maximal left lax extension, i.e. an interpretation
f :W ′→P(P) such that
(a) ff6;
and
(b) if ′ :W ′→P(P) is an interpretation with ′f6, then ′6f.
The existence of both maximal and minimal extensions is assured.
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Lemma 9. Given f :F→F ′ and an interpretation  :W →P(P) then for w′ ∈W ′
f(w′) =
⋃{(w)|f(w) = w′}
and
f(w′) =
⋂{(w)|f(w) = w′}:
Proof. The proof is easy from the de9nitions.
Proposition 8. If f is admissible for  then
f(w′) = f(w′)
for all w′ ∈f(W ).
Proof. If f(w1)=f(w2)=w′, then (w1)= (w2) so the family of sets of which one
takes the union=intersection consists of one set only!
The importance of this is that if f is admissible for , then
f(w′) = (w) if w′ = f(w)
and this is well de9ned on the image of f. Of course, f(w′) is globally diHerent
from f(w′) in general, i.e. for w′ outside the image of f, since if {(w)|f(w)=w′}
is the empty family, then its union is ∅ and its intersection is P itself as the relations
f 6 ′ 6 f
imply for any ′ completing the triangle. (Of course, surjectivity of f would give
f = f globally on W ′.)
The above implies that the ‘internal’ condition on (f; ) that is admissibility, is
equivalent to there being a morphism of models
W






f W ′
′



P(P)
where diHerent ′ can, of course, diHer outside the image of f.
Proposition 9. If f : (F; )→ (F ′; ′) is a morphism of Kripke models and w∈W is
a possible world of F , then for a formula -,
(F; ); w |= - implies (F ′; ′); f(w) |= -:
Proof. This is a standard result and is, for instance, a consequence of the proof of
Proposition 2.4.2, [10, p. 66].
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Before we can compare interpreted systems with Kripke models, we note the corre-
sponding idea of ‘admissibility’ for interpreted systems.
A morphism f : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′) of global states will be said to be admissible for an
interpretation
 : S → P(P)
if f(s1)=f(s2) implies (s1)= (s2).
Remarks (All more or less obvious). (i) If f : ((S; L); )→ ((S ′; L′); ′) is a morphism
of interpreted states, then f is admissible for .
(ii) If f : (S; L)→ (S ′; L′) is admissible for , then the induced
F(f) :F(S; L)→ F(S ′; L′)
is admissible for the (induced) interpretation  : S → P(P) (i.e. considered as part of
the Kripke model ((S;∼1; : : : ;∼n); ) rather than as an interpreted system).
(iii) There are analogues of the lax extension results for pairs (f; ) in the context of
interpreted systems. Within the multiagent setting, a morphism f= {fi}ni= 1 translates
the local world’s view of agent i in the 9rst system into the corresponding local view
of the corresponding agent i in the second:
fi :Li → L′i :
For s1; s2 ∈ S, if for some i, fi(s1)=fi(s2), but the interpretation  distinguishes the
states s1 and s2 (so (s1) = (s2)) then fi will be destroying the potential knowledge
of (S; ) as an interpreted system and f will not be admissible for .
For two interpretations ; ′ : S→P(P), 6′ if for all s∈ S, (s)⊆ ′(s).
If (S; ) is an interpreted system and s∈ S is a global state, it is natural to think of
the set
Th((S; ); s) = {- | (S; ); s |= -}
as the theory of that interpreted system at state s. This is a theory in the usual sense
of modal logic, (cf. [10]). Of course, if M=(F(S; L); ) is the corresponding Kripke
model, it is just the theory of M at s, in the usual sense, so we are not really doing
anything new here:
If 6′ then Th((S; ); s)⊆Th((S; ′); s).
Given this, the interpretation of the lax extensions for interpreted systems is clearer.
Interpreting f as a translation of one set of n-agents collective view to another set of
n-agents, ′ satis9es
′f ¿ 
if the theory Th((S; ′f); s)⊇Th((S; ); s). However for a p∈P and a global state,
s∈ S,
(S; ′f); s |=p if and only if p ∈ ′f(s)
if and only if (S ′; ′); f(s) |= p;
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so
Th((S ′; ′); f(s)) = Th((S; ); s):
Putting this together gives: if ′ is a right lax extension, then
Th((S; ); s) ⊆ Th((S ′; ′); f(s)):
The minimal right lax extension of  along f, thus gets as few extra propositions valid
as possible, similarly for the maximal left extension of  along f.
Returning to our discussion of adjointness, we can summarise what the situation is:
we have an adjoint equivalence
F :Glob:States  Frames: G
Is there an induced equivalence:
F : Int:Systems Kripke:Models :G ?
There is one problem but that has already been examined earlier, although not explicitly
in this context. We have for a frame F , the unit
'F : F → FG(F)
and we saw this is the same as
qF : F → F=∼;
but that if  is an interpretation,  :W →P(P), it need not be compatible for the frame
structure. It might happen that:
w ∼ w′ but (w) = (w′);
thus there would be some p which is in one of (w), (w′), but not the other. Without
loss of generality, assume p∈ (w) but p =∈ (w′). Then although each agent i can
observe p is true at w in the Kripke model (F; ), no agent knows that p is true at w
since for no agent is ✷ip true. This phenomenon cannot occur with interpreted systems
(since w∼w′ if and only if w=w′). A related discussion can be found in [13].
Restricting to Kripke models (F; ) with  compatible with the frame structure then
we get a category Comp:Models and a pair of adjoint functors
F : Int:Systems Comp:Models : G
and these de9ne an equivalence of categories.
5. Colimits of frames and of interpreted systems
Coproducts generalise disjoint unions; colimits generalise unions. Coproducts are
already current tools in modal logic and, in fact, in the emerging theory of covarieties
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of coalgebras, they are an essential part of the structure needed for a dual version
of BirkhoH’s theorem (see [1,8,11]), and thus for the coalgebraic semantics of modal
logics.
The potential for a use of coproducts and more general colimits within a multiagent
theory is considerable. Here we might consider decomposition theories for interpreted
systems, e.g. as colimits of simpler systems such as hypercubes; as Kripke frames
generalise labelled transition systems, decomposition of frames as colimits may help
to ‘modularise’ the systems involved, allowing greater ease of speci9cation and later
checking of implementation of any programs modelling the logical behaviour.
That general colimits do exist in these categories is not in doubt. Kripke frames and
models form categories of coalgebras in the sense, say, of Kurz [11] or Rutten [18]
whilst [Glob:States] is equivalent to a coreEexive subcategory of that category and col-
imits are preserved by coreEexions. In this section, we will extract explicit construction
of such colimits. It is hoped that this will indicate to the less ‘categorically initiated’
some of the potential of these notions, the simplicity of their constructions and their re-
lationship and relevance to important questions in the modelling of multiagent systems.
Coproducts of Kripke frames are easy to construct, see for example [10, p. 67]. We
summarise the construction:
Suppose Fi =(Wi;∼1; : : : ;∼n), i∈ I , is a family of Kripke frames. Form a new frame∐
i∈I
Fi
with set of possible worlds
⊔
i∈I Wi×{i}, i.e. the disjoint union of the Wi and with,
for k =1; 2; : : : ; n, ∼k de9ned by
(!; i) ∼k (!′; j) if and only if ! ∼k !′ and i = j;
so no equivalence class can contain elements from diHerent components.
If i : Wi→P(P) are interpretations, then the coproduct property of disjoint unions
of sets gives an interpretation
 :
∐
i∈I
Wi → P(P)
given by (w; i)= i(w).
Proposition 10. (i) The canonical mappings
ej : Fj →
∐
i∈I
Fi
are bounded morphisms of frames, (similarly for models).
(ii) The frame
∐
i∈I Fi is the coproduct of the Fi, so given any (bounded)
morphisms
fi : Fi → G (resp: fi : (Fi; i)→ (G; ′))
of Kripke frames (resp. models), in the corresponding categories, there is a canonical
(unique) f :
∐
Fi→G such that fi =fei.
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(iii) Th(
∐
Fi)=
⋂
Th(Fi).
Proof. See [10, pp. 67–68].
Suppose (Si; Li), i∈ I , is a family of sets of global states with Li =(Li;1; : : : ; Li; n)
and Si ⊆
∏n
j=1 Li; j.
De9ne for k =1; : : : ; n, (
∐
Li)k =
⋃
Li; k ×{i}, the disjoint union of the Li; k for i∈ I .
De9ne
∐
Si by
⋃
Si×{i}. The various maps from Li; k to
∐
Li; k de9ne a mapping
Si ⊆
∏
Li;k →
∏
k
∐
i
Li;k
and thus by the coproduct property, there is a unique∐
Si →
∏
k
∐
i
Li;k :
It is worth noting that this product
∏
k
∐
i Li; k is usually very diHerent from
∐
i
∏
k Li; k ,
thus, for instance, if A= {1; 2}, the former includes parts such as L1; k ×L2; l for k = l,
but no such terms occur in the other expression. In particular even if (S1; L1) and
(S2; L2) are hypercube systems, their coproduct will not, in general, be one.
Again if interpretations are speci9ed, the coproduct of the interpreted systems is
de9ned with the above as underlying set of global states and with the induced inter-
pretation.
An advantage of a categorical approach is that to check that coproducts of, say,
interpreted systems give one coproducts of the associated Kripke equivalence models is
more or less immediate. Of course, a direct proof can also be given. Only slightly more
diKcult is that the functor G from frames to global states also preserves coproducts.
(Categorically, it is a left adjoint so will preserve colimits.)
It is standard category theory that general existence of colimits follows from exis-
tence of coproducts and coequalisers. We will restrict our discussion to handle the case
of colimits in the categories having bounded morphisms as this is more important for
applications. The data for a coequaliser diagram is given in the form
F1
a 
b
 F2
where a, b are morphisms of frames. The aim is to form a ‘universal’ quotient
F2
c→ F3
having the property that ca= cb. At the level of underlying sets, the obvious thing to do
is to form the smallest equivalence relation on W2, the set of worlds of F2, containing
the pairs (aw1; bw1) for all w1 ∈W1, with the obvious notation. This equivalence relation
is a net, (cf. Kracht ([10], p. 66)), i.e. writing it as R, if x; x′ ∈W2 and xRx′, and in
addition, x∼k ; y, then there is a y′ ∈W2, with y∼k y′ and x′Ry′. The proof uses a
simple induction on the length of the zig-zag of basic pairs, a(w)Rb(w) or b(w)Ra(w),
linking x and x′, together with repeated use of the boundedness of a and b.
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This implies that, if
W3 := W2=R
with c : W2→W3 given by c(x)= [x]R, then there is an induced equivalence relation
∼k on W3 for each k ∈A, de9ned by
[x]R ∼k [y]R
if and only if there are elements x′ ∈ [x]R, y′ ∈ [y]R with x′∼k y′ in W2.
The mapping c :W2→W3 underlies a bounded morphism of frames
c :F2 → F3 := (W3;∼1; : : : ;∼n):
It is then easy to check that c is the coequaliser of a and b.
The case of weak maps is easier, but far less useful for applications, so will be
omitted.
Earlier we mentioned that the class of I -frames was not modally de9nable (see [13]).
The proof used that class was not closed under bounded homomorphic images. From a
categorical viewpoint, this says that the category of I -frames is not a covariety in the
category of all Kripke equivalence frames with bounded morphisms. The subcategory
I -Frames of Frames is a reEexive subcategory (if F is a general frame and F ′ an
I -frame, then any (bounded) frame morphism f :F→F ′ factors through F=∼). The
inclusion is right adjoint to the functor
L : Frames → I -Frames
with L=FG, L(F)=F=∼, but right adjoints do not, in general, preserve colimits, so
does this one preserve our coequalisers? The answer is no. This corresponds closely
to the non-modal de9nability of I -frames, but is also of importance when considering
the question of coequalisers for SGSs. To emphasise the close links, we will give an
example of the colimit of a pair of bounded morphisms of I -frames whose coequaliser
in Frames is not an I -frame. (In fact, this is an adaptation of the neat example used
by Lomuscio and Ryan [13] to show non-modal de9nability of I -frames.)
Example. Let W = {w1; w2; w3; w4} with ∼1 generated by the basic pairs
w1 ∼1 w3 w2 ∼1 w4
and ∼2 by basic pairs
w1 ∼2 w2 w3 ∼2 w4;
so the frame F =(W;∼1;∼2) looks like
w1
2
1
w2
1
w3 2 w4
It is clear that F is an I -frame.
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Let a : F→F be the identity morphism and b : F→F , the obvious automorphism
given by
b(w1) = w4;
b(w2) = w3;
b(w3) = w2;
b(w4) = w1:
We want to consider the coequaliser of the pair
F
a 
b
 F:
Our recipe for its construction gives:
• De9ne R: This is simply generated by
w1Rw4 w2Rw3
i.e. awRbw for each w∈W .
• Form W3 =W=R: So W3 has two elements, which we will denote by
x = {w1; w4};
and
y = {w2; w3}:
• De9ne the relational structure on W3: Here the recipe gives
x ∼1 y since w1 ∼1 w3
and
x ∼2 y since w1 ∼2 w2:
Thus the coequaliser, F3, in Framesb is given by the graph
x
1;2
y
and, of course, this is not an I -frame as x and y are indistinguishable.
The coequaliser of this diagram within I -frames is L(F3), since L, being a left
adjoint preserves coequalisers. This collapses F3 to a single world with the identity
equivalence relation on it.
Coequalisers of morphisms of SGSs are more of a problem to describe explicitly.
In Glob:Statesw, they exist since one just takes the coequalisers of the component
morphisms as the sets of local states of each agent, then takes the product of these
and within that looks at the image set of global states. More precisely, if
a; b : (S1; L1)→ (S2; L2);
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then for each agent, i, we form the coequaliser L3; i of
ai; bi : L1;i → L2;i :
This comes with an induced function
ci : L2;i → L3;i
and we let S3 = c(S2) be the image subset of
∏
L3 under the function
c = (ci)ni=1:
As an example of this consider the SGSs corresponding to the above example under
the functor, G. Here W1 = {{w1; w3}; {w2; w4}}, and to simplify the notation we will
write w1;3 = {w1; w3}, etc. Thus W1, which is W=∼1, will be {w1;3; w2;4}, and similarly
W2 := W=∼2 = {w1;2; w3;4}:
The function
$ : W → W1 ×W2
gives
$(w1) = (w1;3; w1;2);
$(w2) = (w2;4; w1;2);
$(w3) = (w1;3; w3;4);
$(w4) = (w2;4; w3;4):
As to the morphisms, a is the identity and b has coordinate functions
b1(w1;3) = w2;4; b1(w2;4) = w1;3;
b2(w1;2) = w3;4; b2(w3;4) = w1;2;
that is the obvious permutations of W1 and W2.
L1 = L2 = (W1; W2):
The set of local states of the coequalisers have each one element as ai is the identity,
whilst bi permutes the two local states. In this case, therefore, the coequaliser is the
terminal SGS with L3;1 and L3;2 being singletons and S3 one as well. This is in
agreement with the calculation for the corresponding frames after application of the
reEector, L. All the maps happen to be bounded so just from this simple example one
might expect there to be a similar picture throughout Glob:States, however this is far
from being the case. It seems that non-observable states can cause havoc, wrecking
the frame structure underlying the set of global states. This is even true in the single
agent setting!
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Example. Let L1 = {x1; x2; x3; x4}, L2 = {x1; x2; x3},
a(x1) = x2; a(x2) = x1; a(x3) = x3; a(x4) = x3;
whilst
b(x1) = x1; b(x2) = x2; b(x3) = x3; b(x4) = x1;
but S = {x1; x2; x3}. Note that x4 is not part of the set of global states although ‘global’
and ‘local’ are not good terms to use here. (We could have taken a second agent with
a set of local states L2, S1 = S ×L2⊆L1×L2 and a; b extended by the product with the
identity function on L2, however this would have obscured the fact that the problem is
with the ‘unobservable’ states, i.e. those outside the set of global states. The problem
has nothing to do with the number of agents.)
Considering S as a frame, the coequaliser of a and b (restricted to S) has two worlds,
{x1; x2} and {x3}. Considered as (S; L), where L= {L1}, the coequaliser of a and b is
a singleton, since x1 = b(x4) and a(x4)= x3. The globally unobservable x4 has resulted
in the two worlds of S=R being collapsed together.
If one now considers the essentially equivalent SGSs with L1 replaced by L2, the
coequaliser will be as expected, i.e. S=R with local state set L2=R, which is, of course,
the same. In other words, the crude coequaliser construction in Glob:States does not
respect essential equivalence. Diagrams in Glob:States, which would become isomor-
phic if considered as diagrams in [Glob:States], can lead to coequalisers which are not
essentially equivalent. The boundedness or otherwise of the morphisms involved is not
the question as boundedness only involves conditions on the global states. Thus the
crude coequalisers are not the answer to the problem of 9nding coequalisers of SGSs
with bounded morphisms that correspond to those in the frames.
Remark. It might be thought that these unobservable states should be thrown out from
the start in some way, e.g. by considering replete systems only, since such states are
not involved with the multiagent system being modelled. The author believes that may
not be the case. Increasingly, one looks for modularised information systems since
they stand a better chance of being shown to be doing what they are supposed to do.
A multiagent systems may consist of various components or modules and diHerent
components may involve diHerent subsets of each agent’s set of local states. To insist
that all systems should be replete would hamstring any attempts to apply modular
decomposition ideas in this area. This does mean that care will be needed when looking
for modular decompositions in terms of colimits of interpreted systems.
We now can use, however, that [Glob:States] is equivalent to a reEexive subcategory
of frames (with bounded morphisms), namely to I -Frames. Suppose
(S1; L1)
a 
b
 (S2; L2)
is a diagram in [Glob:States], so a, b are determined only up to essential equivalence
and we may assume both (S1; L1) and (S2; L2) are replete systems. The corresponding
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diagram of frames is
F(S1; L1)
F(a) 
F(b)
F(S2; L2) :
Now we can form a coequaliser frame, F =(S3;∼1; : : : ;∼n), where S3 = S2=R is formed
as above, i.e. R is generated by
a(s) R b(s)
and ∼k is given by
[x]R ∼k [y]R
if there are x′ ∈ [x]R, y′ ∈ [y]R with x′k =y′k .
This frame, F need not be an I -frame, but that does not matter since we will convert
it back to an SGS via the functor G. This will give a set of global states with associated
frame F=∼ with ∼=⋂∼k . The individual agent’s set of local states will be S3=∼k for
agent k.
It would seem at 9rst sight that this system was going to be diKcult to work
with since it involves a fair number of diHerent quotienting operations for various
equivalence relations. For instance, the description of a ‘quotienting’ morphism from
(S2; L2) to G(F) initially looks diKcult, but we have a description of F as a coequaliser
in the diagram
F(S1; L1)
F(a) 
F(b)
F(S2; L2) c  F
and as G is left adjoint, it preserves coequalisers which means that
GF(S1; L1)
GF(a) 
GF(b)
 GF(S2; L2) G(c)  G(F)
is also a coequaliser diagram. This, in fact, does the job, since we have assumed both
(S1; L1) and (S2; L2) are replete so, by Proposition 1, both
+(Si ;Li) : GF(Si; Li)→ (Si; Li); i = 1; 2;
are isomorphisms. As c is bounded, so is G(c), and we have a description of coequalis-
ers in [Glob:States].
We thus have explicit elementary constructions for colimits in both the categories,
Frames and [Glob:States].
Example. By way of illustration of how colimits might be used, consider a set of
global states (S; L) in which
L1 = {l1; l2; l3; l4};
L2 = {m1; m2; m3; m4}
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and S =L1×L2\{(l1; m1); (l1; m4); (l4; m1); (l4; m4)}, so S is a cross shaped region.
Intuitively S consists of two overlapping hypercubes. One is speci9ed by SA =L1×
{m2, m3}, the other by SB = {l2; l3}×L2.
The overlap is also a hypercube, SC = {l2; l3}×{m2; m3}. There are two obvious
maps from SC to SA unionsq SB sending the overlap into each of the ‘cross arms’. We leave
it to the reader to check that the resulting coequaliser is the cross shaped (S; L).
Models. The above handles colimits of frames and of sets of global states. How about
colimits of models? There is no problem. In all cases, if the frames=SGSs are given with
interpretations, i : Si→P(P), then, as the colimiting constructions are built up from
colimiting operations on the underlying sets of possible worlds, these interpretations
yield a cocone with vertex P(P) and hence, there is a unique induced interpretation
on the colimit.
Proposition 11. The categories Comp:Models and [Int:Systems] have all colimits.
Remarks. (i) As before the problem of indistinguishable worlds having diHerent inter-
preted values forces us to use Comp:Models not Kripke:Models.
(ii) Of course, the above proposition is also a consequence of the general coalgebraic
approach to modal logics. This paper only scratches the surface of the potential uses
of that general theory to MASs. (For more on coalgebras and their link with modal
logics, see, for instance the excellent introductory notes by Kurz [11], and the references
therein.)
6. Limits?
Dual to coproducts, one has the question of products of both models=frames and
interpreted systems=SGSs. In general modal logic, the intuitive constructions do not
always work. The standard example is with F1, an irreEexive frame on a single world
and F2, a reEexive one again on one world, then the obvious candidate, F1×F2 does
not give the product frame. The problem can be quite subtle, but need not concern us
here as the logics involved are not directly applicable to multiagent systems.
The question of products will be the subject of a later paper in this project as
it requires the development of some diHerent techniques including a discussion of
polymonadic algebras as models for multiagent systems and the extended Stone du-
ality between these and generalised frames. It can also be approached by coalgebraic
methods.
The reason for wanting a development of limits of models=frames and interpreted
systems=SGSs is the potential of these structures for detailed analyses of ‘knowledge
update’. Initial investigations show that pullbacks (a simple form of limit) seem to
give a powerful descriptive tool for studying update in MAS. Mathematically, exist-
ing descriptions of knowledge and belief update strongly resemble certain well known
constructions from topology and recent links between topological ideas and both dis-
tributed systems and modal logic proof systems seem to indicate that this relationship
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is potentially important in understanding the evolution of knowledge in a multiagent
setting.
7. Conclusion and future directions
The categorical comparison between Kripke frames and sets of Global States
extends the results of Lomuscio, van der Meyden and Ryan, but in a non-trivial way.
The equivalences of categories that have been exhibited emphasise aspects of these
models for multiagent systems that were previously not taken into account. In par-
ticular the existence of non-observable local states in an SGS or interpreted system
has consequences when considering colimits of such systems, whilst the existence of
indistinguishable worlds in a Kripke frame, can cause problems of compatibility with
the interpretation.
The categorical analysis of these models for MASs suggests new directions, in
particular decomposition theorems yielding a potential for ‘modularisation’ of mul-
tiagent settings. This, and the knowledge update problem mentioned in the last section,
would seem to need a thorough treatment of the algebraic semantics, [6], of the modal
logics used for MASs. Given that algebraic models for MASs could potentially be anal-
ysed by the powerful mathematical tools available within several branches of algebra,
some of this would seem worth investigating as a step towards a greater mathematisa-
tion of the analysis of multiagent systems so as to complement the logical analysis that
has been so successfully applied up to now. This is the aim of the project ‘Categorical
Perspectives on Multiagent Systems’ mentioned earlier. Another aspect of this project
can be seen in [17].
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